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This cloud has a silver lining: economic crisis and technological exploration 
 
Abstract 
We used a large-sample inductive approach to explore the impact of economic crises and 
recessions on technological exploration in the regions. Exploration is associated with the creation 
of new technological trajectories in regions and hence their resilience. In context of the US, we 
show that the intensity of Financial Crisis (2007-08) and the following recession increased the 
incidence of regional exploration; regions which were hit the hardest by the Crisis and recession 
engaged in distant search the most. Subsequently, we examined three potential mechanisms that 
support exploration – (a) shift in the R&D emphasis of resourceful innovator firms in the region 
from exploitation to exploration, (b) changes in the demography of regional actors (new firms 
and inventors), and (c) structural changes in the regional coinventors’ network, lowering 
hierarchy. We found empirical support for the first and the third mechanism. This paper indicates 
that economic crises may indeed punctuate regional evolution, and by encouraging exploration, 
begin a new cycle of variation, selection and retention. Examination of potential mechanisms 
reveals how resourceful innovator firms respond to economic crises, and how these responses 
have system (region) level effects, potentially in terms of specialization and resilience in the 
long-term. This paper also contributes to the literature on network dynamics and establishes the 
effects of hierarchy on region’s innovation outcomes. 
Keywords: Economic crisis, technological exploration, firms’ R&D strategy, regional innovation 
network 
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1. Introduction 
Large-scale economic crises are associated with the contraction of real GDP, crash of real assets 
and equity markets, decrease in productivity, and spikes in unemployment rate (Levchenko, 
Lewis, & Tesar, 2010; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Duval, Hong, & Timmer, 2020). One of the 
most influential theorists of entrepreneurship – Joseph Schumpeter – who experienced Great 
Depression (1929-351), however, remained unruffled by the incidence of such crises. He 
considered them as laboratories of new ideas, when much of the deadwood was cleared and 
entrepreneurs adopted the best innovations and practices (Schumpeter, 1939). It seems counter-
intuitive and paradoxical that an event, which destroys so much wealth in the economy and 
brings so much hardship to the people, can have positive long-terms effects. Following the 
insights of Schumpeter, can we argue that economic crises and the ensuing recessions drive 
commitment to and production of new technologies, and thus creation of new trajectories at the 
organizational and regional levels? Despite its immense theoretical and policy relevance, few 
management and innovation scholars have examined whether, and how, economic crises affect 
the incidence of technological exploration. In this paper, we seek to establish this relationship 
empirically and understand the potential mechanisms. 
Relationship between economic crises and innovation is theoretically complex; crises 
affect innovation through multiple mechanisms operating simultaneously, at times with opposing 
effects. Scholars have studied the effects of downturns on firms’ R&D investments and their 
performance effects (Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1998; Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette, & Eymard, 
2012; Paunov, 2012; Archibugi, Filippetti & Frenz, 2013; Amore, 2015; Armand & Mendi, 
                                                          
1 To give a perspective, between 1929 and 1932, the global GDP fell by an estimated 15%. 
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2018; Flammer & Ioannou, 2018). However, we know relatively less about how downturns 
affect the nature of technology search, whether it increases exploitation or exploration (Laperche, 
Lefebvre & Langlet, 2011). Another limitation of this literature is that it examines the effects of 
crises and recessions on innovations only on firms; it conspicuously omits region as the unit of 
analysis. This omission is all the more surprising as innovation in regional context is a long-
established field of research and its importance has been well underlined for theory, practice and 
policy. Regions have their own specializations, structural features, productivity, evolution and 
dynamic adaptability (Bathelt & Gluckler, 2003; Boschma, 2015; Menzel & Fronahl, 2010; 
Keeble & Wilkinson, 1999). Regional factors also affect organizational phenomena and 
decisions such as inception and growth of the entrepreneurial ventures (Armington & Acs, 2002; 
Spigel, 2017), and location selection decisions, internal venturing, openness strategies and 
competitiveness of the large firms (Almeida, 1996; Whittington, Owen-Smith & Powell, 2009). 
Pulling out regions out of crises and recessions is a primary concern for policy makers, given 
their effects on welfare. During Financial Crisis (2008-09), governments at various levels acted 
as the lenders of last resort, bailed out illiquid firms and institutions, and devised stimulus 
packages (Congleton, 2009; Breitenfellner & Wagner, 2010). Policy makers are similarly 
engaging in and supporting technological and frugal innovations to save their societies from the 
COVID-19 pandemic and revive their economies (Harris, Bhatti, Buckley & Sharma 2020). 
Given its importance, we focus on region as a unit of analysis, and study the effects of crises and 
recessions on regional exploration, which contributes to a region’s survival and competitiveness 
in the long run. 
A region comprises of multiple actors which may be impacted by an economic crisis 
distinctly. It can possibly invoke different responses from diverse regional actors, while also 
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influencing the interaction dynamics among them. Given the theoretical complexity about how 
an economic crisis influences the direction of technology search in a region, we used a large N 
inductive empirical approach in this paper. Our approach is similar to a few recent studies in 
strategy (e.g., Lyngsie & Foss, 2017; Vakili & Zhang, 2018) and innovation policy (e.g., Amore, 
2015). We relied on the rich patent data to capture innovation activities, construct regional 
innovation (coinventors’) networks, and identify technological specialization and exploration in 
the regions (Ter Wal & Boschma, 2009; Fleming, King & Juda, 2007; Breschi & Lissoni, 2009). 
Operationalizing regions in terms of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (henceforth MSA) in the 
United States (Singh, 2005), we first empirically validated the relationship between the intensity 
of Financial Crisis (2007-08) and the rate of regional exploration. To this end, we employed 
fixed effect panel regression model (2004-14). We complemented this analysis with a difference-
in-difference approach (e.g., Vakili & Zhang, 2018) for a stronger claim of causality, exploiting 
differences in the severity of Financial Crises on different MSAs. Subsequently, we theoretically 
identified three potential mechanisms that should support regional exploration. Crises engender 
high uncertainty (Bloom, 2014) and adversely affect demand conditions, thereby lowering the 
opportunity cost of exploration and weakening firm-performance (Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1998; 
Aghion et al, 2012). Resourceful innovator firms respond to uncertainty and low performance by 
creating growth options and accentuating exploration, especially if increased exploitation doesn’t 
restore performance (Bloom, 2014; Greve, 2003; Laperche et al, 2011). Thus, under crisis, a high 
concentration of patenting by resourceful innovator firms should increase regional exploration. 
We found evidence that the concentration of patenting by assignees during the Crisis mediated 
its effects on regional exploration. Secondly, we tested whether changes in the populations of 
inventors and organizations mediated the effects of Crisis on regional exploration. Crises create a 
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churn in these populations by inducing firm-mortality, discontinuation of existing projects, 
necessity-driven new venturing, and creation of growth options by resourceful firms. New 
ventures (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) and cognitively unbounded inventors (Cirillo, Brusoni, & 
Valentini, 2014) are more likely to engage in exploration. However, we didn’t get evidence that 
Financial Crisis and recession increased new venturing or induction of new inventors in the 
regions. We also postulated that crises could also create a churn in the regional innovation 
network. Discontinuation of collaborations in existing technology areas and formation in the new 
ones could lower hierarchy in the regional innovation network. Centralization supports 
exploitation and stifle generation and pursuance of new ideas, whereas decentralization supports 
exploration (Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Jansen, van den Bosch & Volberda, 2006; Lavie, Stettner 
& Tushman, 2010; Keum & See, 2016). We found evidence that a decrease in network hierarchy 
partly mediated the effects of Crisis on regional exploration. 
Exploration and long-term ability to create new technological trajectories contribute to a 
region’s dynamic adaptability and resilience (Boschma, 2015; Martin & Sunley, 2015). 
Understanding factors predicting regional exploration is, therefore, important from both 
theoretical and policy perspectives. Our paper is a contribution in this direction. By studying how 
regions create new development paths when hit by crises and thus generate new specializations, 
potentially in emerging and futuristic technology areas, we respond to the call for research on 
regional, organizational and network resilience (Boschma, 2015; Martin & Sunley, 2015; Kahn, 
Barton & Fellows, 2013; Van der Vegt, Essens, Wahlstrom & George, 2015).  
The two mechanisms for which we found empirical support contribute to two further 
streams of research. The first stream investigates the effects of crises and recessions on firms’ 
R&D (Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1998; Aghion et al, 2012; Paunov, 2012; Archibugi et al, 2013; 
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Flammer & Iaonnou, 2020). It highlights that resourceful firms, which are less dependent on 
external capital, increase their R&D investments during downturns, and it positively affects their 
performance in subsequent periods. We empirically add that these firms emphasize exploration, 
i.e. make R&D investments in new technology areas, during the crises. These findings are 
consistent with the arguments of Bloom (2014) and the qualitative evidence found by Laperche 
et al (2011). The second stream of works establishes the effects of structural characteristics of 
regional knowledge networks on innovation and entrepreneurship (Cowan & Jonard, 2004, 
Fleming, Juda & King, 2007; Saxenian, 1994; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). By studying how 
structural changes mediate the effects of crises and recessions on regional exploration, we 
respond to scholars calling for research on networks from a dynamic perspective (Ahuja, Soda & 
Zaheer, 2012; Brenner, Cantner & Graf, 2013). Studies on network dynamics have focused 
primarily on organic, incremental changes (Madhavan, Koka & Prescott, 1998, Sytch & 
Tatarynowicz, 2014) or quantitative case studies of cluster evolution (Ter Wal, 2013). In their 
simulation-based study, Hernandez & Menon (2017) explored the effects of radical events such 
as node deletion due to exogenous conditions, on network structure. This paper adds a step 
forward in this direction, illustrating how economic crises can trigger changes in the structure of 
regional innovation networks, thereby supporting a certain kind of search efforts. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of works on 
economic crises and their implications for innovation. We then describe the context, data and 
empirical methods. Subsequently, we present MSA-level results of the effect of Financial Crisis 
and following recession on technological exploration, first using panel regression and then 
difference-in-difference analysis. After documenting the effects, we examine the potential 
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mechanisms, explaining their theoretical rationale and then presenting and discussing the 
empirical evidence. The final section offers concluding remarks. 
2. Economic crises and innovation 
Crises are rare, unanticipated disruptive events which threaten not only the life-sustaining 
systems, functions and critical infrastructures in a society but also its core values (Hermann, 
1963; Boin 2009). Crises aggravate quickly without remedial interventions; thus, they often 
create panic, exert immense pressure on the decision-makers, and if not dealt effectively, erode 
the legitimacy of the political leadership and institutions (Christensen, Laegreid & Rykkja, 
2016). Some scholars view man-made crises from a process perspective – the triggering event 
being an outcome of a long period of incubation which creates a crisis-fostering environment. 
Thus, crises result from a gradual accumulation of dysfunctions, i.e. unintended detrimental 
effects of purposeful social actions for actors’ gains, over long time (Lodge, 2009; Williams, 
Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd & Zhao, 2017). 
 Most economic crises originate in the area of finance, and therefore, are exogenous to 
regional innovation ecosystems and technology firms (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008). For instance, 
Financial Crisis in the United States (2007-08) can be traced back to the sub-prime lending crisis 
(Mian & Sufi, 2009; Sanders, 2008). Similarly, the 2009 Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe was 
triggered by the weaknesses in public finance of certain EU member states (Lane, 2012). Despite 
origin in finance, economic crises often profoundly affect the whole economy. They trigger 
periods of higher uncertainty (Bloom, 2014; Singh, Mahmood, & Natarajan, 2017), in which 
consumer demand decreases or is difficult to predict (Mian, Rao, & Sufi, 2013), cost of capital 
increases (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Lee, Sameen, & Cowling, 2015), and the incidence of 
contractions, massive layoffs, and firm-failures increases (Bernanke, 1981; Bhattacharjee, 
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Higson, Holly, & Kattuman, 2009; Chodorow-Reich, 2014). Governments take policy and 
regulatory measures to contain a crisis, reduce its deleterious effects, and stimulate and ease the 
recovery (Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2016; Rodrik, 1996). 
 Management and organization scholars have recently started studying economic crises, 
primarily in context of organizational survival and strategic response. For instance, Greve & Yue 
(2017) have investigated what determines firms’ capacity to execute collective action to tide over 
a looming crisis. Similarly, Dowell, Shackell & Stuart (2011) studied how corporate governance 
and CEO power factor in survival of the firms during financial crises. An emerging stream of 
works focuses on the effects of crises and downturns on firms’ strategy and innovation 
expenditures. Crises and recessions have constraining effects on innovation, especially for less 
resourceful firms (Lee, Sameen & Cowling, 2015; Brautzsch, Gunther, Loose, Ludwig, & 
Nulsch, 2015; Paunov, 2012). However, resourceful firms in technology-intensive industries may 
indeed invest more (rather than less) in R&D in order to get themselves out of the crisis (Aghion, 
Berman, Eymard, Askenazy, & Cette, 2012; Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1998; Flammer & Ioannou, 
2018). Flammer & Ioannou (2018) discovered that those firms which strategically invested more 
in R&D during the crisis perform better in the following years. Archibugi, Filippetti & Frenz 
(2013), based on the UK Community Innovation Surveys, found that the crisis led to a 
concentration of innovative activities within a small group of firms. Large firms with internal 
financial resources which were already highly innovative before the crisis increased their 
investments. Additionally, fast-growing new entrants also exhibited high R&D investments 
during the crisis. They found that firms pursuing strategies towards new products and markets 
development during the crisis coped better. Amore (2015) highlights learning effects in R&D 
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strategies during recessions: firms that invested heavily in R&D in previous downturns invest 
more, and more effectively in R&D in the following business downturn. 
The literature reviewed so far suggests a persistence (or increase) of innovation activities, 
at least by some firms, during the crises despite financial constraints. However, a few questions 
remain unanswered. What is the nature of innovative activities during a crisis: do firms continue 
developing innovating in their core technologies, or they invest in promising new ones? What are 
the responses to and effects of the crises on innovation at the aggregate levels? Scholars have 
studied the effects of crisis primarily on individual firms. Given that crises often hit some regions 
more than others and that multiple economic and institutional actors play a role in fostering 
innovation, it is important to understand how crises affect innovation at the regional level. To fill 
these gaps, we studied how the intensity of Financial Crisis (2007-08) and the following 
recession affected the incidence of regional exploration, i.e. innovation in technologies in which 
the regional inventors had not innovated before. Once established the main effect, we sought to 
understand the mechanisms underpinning the observed effect. 
3. Context, data and sample 
3.1 Context and sources 
We explored the effects of Financial Crisis in 2007-08 on innovation in the US regions, as 
proxied by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). An MSA is a geographical entity, with an urban 
core with a minimum population of fifty thousand, which consists of the adjacent counties 
deeply integrated with the urban core socially and economically (National Longitudinal Survey, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics)2. Prior works indicate that MSAs well capture the dynamics of 
                                                          
2 For example, Tucson (46040) in Arizona is an MSA with only one urban region and one county (Pima). San 
Francisco-Oakland-Fremont (41860), on the other hand, has three integrated urban centers and it consists of five 
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localized, urban innovation ecosystem, and their functioning contribute importantly to regional 
economic outcomes (Fleming et al. 2007; Singh, 2005). 
We focus on the period 2003 – 20143, considering a window of five years around the 
Financial Crisis (2007-08). The Crisis began in the sub-prime mortgage market, with a high 
default rate of home mortgage sector. Equity in home is the largest asset of a median family in 
the US, and constitutes a major component of national wealth. Government policies tend to 
increase the value of existing homes and supply of the mortgages. From 1950 to 2000, the real 
value of houses increased by an annual growth rate of 2.75% per year. However, between first 
quarter of 2004 and the third quarter of 2007, the real median house prices grew by 50%. 
Creation of this new wealth and economic growth (increase in consumption and investments) 
reflected in the stock market – Dow Jones Industrial Average rose by 34% in these two and half 
years, in contrast to 4.42% per annum between 1950 and 2000.  
Bubble in the US housing sector was driven primarily by buyers’ overextension, 
subprime lending and speculation. Total US home mortgage lending in 2008 first quarter stood at 
an unprecedented level of 10.07 trillion against the GDP of 14.651 trillion USD (FRED). In 
newly originated securitized mortgages, subprime and near-prime mortgages accounted for 40% 
in 2006, against 9% in 2001. Mortgage lenders sold the mortgages as private label securities 
(PLS) to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, which pooled these mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
and sold to investors. By the end of 2007, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae owned over 300 billion 
USD of PLS, of which 133 billion USD were PLS backed by single-family subprime mortgages. 
                                                          
counties - Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, and San Mateo. 
http://www.nlsinfo.org/usersvc/NLSY97/NLSY97Rnd9geocodeCodebookSupplement/gatt101.htm#cbsa8 
3 A change in MSA-delineation and code-assignment (CBSA-scheme) occurred in 2003. Census Bureau created a 
new standard - Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSA) that includes both metropolitan and micropolitan statistical 
areas. We use regions as delineated in 2003, together with their CBSA. 
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By mid-2007, when the rates of mortgage loan delinquency and foreclosures escalated, the 
primary and secondary markets for subprime lending collapsed – rapid devaluation of MBS and 
the liquidity crisis for banks and financial institutions that had invested heavily in these toxic 
instruments led to a series of bankruptcies. AIG, Bear Sterns, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae came to the brink of failure and had to be salvaged, while Lehman 
Brothers, with about 700 billion USD of liabilities, filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. 
The total number of Chapter 11 cases filed increased from 1583 in 2007 Q3 to 3175 in 2008 Q4. 
Stock markets soon caught the crisis – Dow Jones Industrial Average index plummeted from 
17273.21 in October 2007 to 8623.84 in February 2009. US GDP growth declined from 1.876% 
in 2007 to -2.537% in 2009. The unemployment rate shot up from 4.7% in September 2007 to 
10% in October 2009. Technology firms across industries, such as Hewlett Packard, Verizon, 
AT&T, GE, Sun Microsystems, Pfizer, Merck, Boeing, GM and Ford, undertook substantial 
downsizing (McIntyre, 2010). 
As the mortgage lending dried up – the median housing prices slid down by 19.036% 
between 2007 Q1 and 2009 Q1, with significant variation at the regional level. Thus, there was a 
regional variance not only in the destruction of household wealth and a decline in the 
consumption, but also in the perception of crisis and the resultant uncertainty among market and 
institutional actors and people in general. To understand the impact of Financial Crisis on each 
MSA, we combined data on housing prices from Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
macroeconomic and political economic data at the state and the MSA levels from US Census 
Bureau and US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and patent data from the USPTO. We used patent 
data to capture innovation activities in each MSA. Patent data have been considered a reliable 
indicator of regional innovation (e.g., Bottazzi & Peri, 2003; Breschi & Lenzi, 2015; Fleming et 
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al, 2007; Singh, 2005; Montresor & Quatraro, 2017). We retrieved the patent data from Patents 
View and using the information of inventors’ location, assigned patents to each MSA (Breschi & 
Lenzi, 2015; Singh, 2005; Crescenzi, Max & Rodríguez-Pose, 2016). We created the variables 
the application date of the granted patents in order to capture the time when the technology was 
invented and the related innovative activities took place in a region. 
3.2 Variables 
Dependent variable. Technological exploration and exploitation have been conceptualized in 
terms of distant and local search (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Exploitation implies search for 
solutions in the vicinity of actor’s preexisting knowledge-base, and involves innovating along the 
pre-existing technological trajectories (Cyert & March, 1963; Lopez-Vega, Tell & 
Vanhaverbeke, 2016; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Stuart & Podolny, 
1996). Exploration implies “pursuit of new knowledge” (Levinthal & March, 1993), and 
involves an actor’s search for alternatives on new or unrelated technological trajectories or 
markets (Lopez-Vega et al, 2016). Thus, if an innovation belongs to a technology area in which 
regional inventors have already innovated, it represents local search (exploitation). In contrast, if 
no regional inventor innovated in that technology area, i.e., it is new or unrelated to region’s 
knowledge base, the innovation represents distant search (exploration). 
 We used US patent classification (USPC) to identify whether an innovation belongs to a 
new or unrelated technology area from a region’s perspective. USPC classifies each patent into 
at least one main class and within it, at least one subclass. By examining such class-subclasses 
assignment of all patents filed from a region, one can identify region’s technological knowledge-
base (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Based on these premises, we 
reasoned that if no regional inventor filed patents in a technology main class in the last ten 
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years4, the region doesn’t possess knowledge-base in that broad technology area. Therefore, if an 
inventor from the region innovates in such technology area, he (she) is engaging in distant search 
(exploration). Our dependent variable is the share of exploratory inventions in all patents filed 
from the region in that specific year. 
Independent variable. We capture the intensity of 2007-08 Financial Crisis in regions through 
changes in the housing price index (hereafter HPI) at the MSA level. The bursting of housing 
bubble, which had grown since late 1990s and peaked in 2006-07, was the first visible 
consequence of the subprime crisis and of its impact on regions (Sanders, 2008). Prior works 
also used housing prices as an indicator of the intensity of crisis in the regions because it 
correlated strongly with the changes in consumer demand, employment growth, and wages at the 
US county-level (Adelino, Schoar, & Severino, 2015; Mian & Sufi, 2014). Scholars in the fields 
of economics and finance also use housing price elasticity to measure the variation in the 
severity of recession (Giroud & Mueller, 2015). We obtained the MSA-level quarterly data on 
the movement of housing price index from Federal Housing Finance Agency, and took its mean 
for the year. The origin of Financial Crisis also indicates that it was an exogenous shock to 
regional innovation. For robustness check, we took the GDP per capita to capture the Financial 
Crisis and recession (Bloom, 2014). 
Controls. We controlled factors which influence regional innovation and potentially exploration. 
Structural characteristics of region’s innovation network are known to influence its innovative 
performance. Size of the network, i.e., number of inventors, is indicative of region’s intellectual 
                                                          
4 Technologies evolve over time – and a region’s (organization’s) knowledge and competencies in a technology area 
gradually become redundant if it is not continually generating new knowledge in that area. A gap of ten years in 
patenting in a technology class is good to suggest that the region’s knowledge-base in the technology area is non-
existent or redundant for all practical reasons. Further, if we don’t take a ten-year window, more exploration will be 
reported in early years, e.g., in 1992 than in 2017. 
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resourcefulness. A large network of inventors signifies that the region is a central technopole, 
with deep organizational and technical competencies, superior endowment of supportive 
institutions, and a strong learning dynamic (Todtling & Trippl, 2005). Such regions exhibit 
higher efficiency in technology development (Antonelli, 2000) and commercialization (Song, 
Min, Lee & Seo, 2017; Min, Kim & Swang, 2020). Since the size-distribution is highly skewed 
in our dataset, we took its natural log.  
 We control for two structural characteristics of the regional networks, viz., connectedness 
and density, while test the third (hierarchy) as a mediating mechanism for the effect of Crisis and 
recession on regional exploration. Dense, connected networks are efficient for disseminating 
information and transferring complex knowledge. However, inefficient networks are supportive 
of exploration. Fragmentation and isolation of sub-groups sustain diversity in the regional 
network and enable parallel search and recombination (Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Fang, Lee & 
Schilling, 2010; Funk, 2014). Shorter path lengths and larger connected components positively 
affect region’s innovation performance (Fleming et al, 2007). We also control for the external 
orientation of regional inventors (ratio of external and internal collaboration ties). Inventors 
located in regions with high density of research institutions and firms tend to source knowledge 
internally, whereas those located in peripheral regions with weaker innovation ecosystems 
exhibit a higher external orientation (Perkmann, 2006; Todtling, Lengauer & Hoglinger, 2011). 
Between regions of comparable innovation profile, a higher external orientation may imply 
access to diverse knowledge resources, possibility of boundary-spanning between communities 
of inventors from different regions, and higher potential of commercializing the innovations. 
 Technological, economic and institutional profile of the regions constitute another set of 
controls. Region’s specialization in a certain industry has an inverse U relationship with 
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innovation efficiency due to an interplay between Marshallian and Jacobian externalities (Fritsch 
& Slavtchev, 2010). However, narrow specialization technological specialization can have lock-
in effects, and can inhibit distant search and novel recombination. We operationalize region’s 
specialization/diversity by measuring the concentration (Herfindahl Hirschman Index) of 
patenting by technologies (USPC main classes). Size of high-tech industries and quality of 
human capital in these industries signify technological competence of the regions, and are hence 
controlled (Sleuwaegen & Boiardi, 2014). Further, region’s public expenditure on higher 
education affect its innovativeness. Higher education contributes to regional innovation directly 
by creating valuable scientific knowledge, and indirectly by inducing industrial R&D 
investments in the region (Anselin, Varga & Acs, 1997; Jaffe, 1989; Sleuwaegen & Boiardi, 
2014). Table 1 summarizes our main constructs and controls, their operationalization, and details 
of the data sources. We also control for the number of patents the region files in each USPC 
main-class in the given year and the year dummy to account for unobserved trends affecting 
regional exploration. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
3.3 Econometric model 
We propose two research designs to test our framework. First, we estimated a panel regression, 
with MSA-fixed effects (Fleming et al. 2007). Although this approach does not allow us to fully 
address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, it can help us unveil the associations between 
constructs of interest in our hypotheses. The equation we estimated reads as follows: 
Explorationit+1 = β0+ β1.Shockit-2+ αZ+ εit … (1) 
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We used a one-year lag between the dependent variable (exploration) and the control 
variables, and further two years lag with the crisis. The choice is based on evidence that the 
housing price crash was triggered by the subprime crisis, which took some time to show effects 
on the whole economy (OECD 2008)5. Figure 1 exhibits the temporal trends of declines in HPI 
in the MSAs and the US GDP – it is evident that the latter followed the former with a lag of 
about one year. Housing prices crashed in 2007 whereas the US GDP started witnessing decline 
in 2008. Firms and inventors would take further time to respond to the crisis by reorienting their 
innovation strategies and collaboration networks, and file patents. For robustness analysis, when 
we use MSA level GDP per capita (Bloom, 2014), we take a lag of one year (Shockit-1). Notably, 
the GDP recovered faster than the housing prices; however, the latter manifested the optimism of 
consumers and investors, and influencing the psychology of (perception of Crisis by) the 
regional actors more directly. All variables are standardized so that the coefficient-size is easier 
to interpret. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
As a starting point, we did the descriptive analysis in order to see the distribution of each 
variable. It is presented in table 2. On an average, 14.1% innovations represent exploration in 
terms of distant search from the regional perspective. Housing Price Index was 100 for each 
                                                          
5 OECD Report: 
http://oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/2753/From_the_financial_crisis_to_the_economic_downturn.htm
l 
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MSA in the first quarter of 1995. Its mean value for our period was 169.087. Mean per capita 
real GDP (chained 2009 USD) across MSAs is 41650.38, whereas the mean salary in high-tech 
industries was 49732.14 USD. New assignees in the region accounted for 29.375% of the total 
innovations in the region. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 After running the full panel regression, we generated correlation matrix, presented in 
Table 3 below. As we can notice, correlation between the independent and the control variables 
is low. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
4.2 Panel regression with fixed effects and sensitivity analyses 
Table 4 presents our main results. Model 1 and 2 predict the rate of exploration in the MSA. 
Model 1 includes the control variables, which can theoretically explain innovation and 
exploration in the regions. As expected, large, hierarchical networks which are less supportive of 
exploration. Coefficient of the natural log of network size is -0.5228 (p=0.000). Quality of 
human capital in the region significantly predicts regional exploration (coefficient: 0.0870; p= 
0.000). Other controls have small and non-significant effects; however, their directions are in 
line with expectations. In model 2, we introduce the independent variable – housing price index 
(HPI). We find that HPI negatively affected regional exploration (coefficient: -0.0703; p= 0.000). 
It implies that regional exploration is counter-cyclical – its incidence increases during economic 
crises and recessions. 
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------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 Model 3 presents the results of robustness analysis done with per capita GDP of MSAs as 
a proxy of the intensity of Financial Crisis and the following recession in the regions. Per capita 
GDP in MSA had a significant negative effect (coefficient: -0.0698; p: 0.036) on regional 
exploration. Thus, Crisis and recession had a positive effect on exploration. 
 For robustness of our results, we controlled further policy measures, such as public 
capital outlays and spending on public services. The effects were not significant, and for the sake 
of parsimony, we didn’t include them in our final analysis. We also sought to control the 
disbursement of public funds in regions through American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA), 2009. However, the data seems fragmented – we have missing values for almost two-
thirds of observations. 
4.3 Assessing causality 
Though Financial Crisis was exogenous to high-tech sector, and there is a lag of three years 
between the movement of housing price index in a region and the effects on exploration in terms 
of patenting, there can be concerns of some omitted variables which might affect both our 
independent and dependent variables. For a stronger claim that economic crisis causes a higher 
incidence of regional exploration, we use difference-in-difference design by comparing regions 
that were hit severely by the Crisis with those which were not so severely hit (Vakili & Zhang, 
2018). Difference-in-difference has been used in natural experiments and captures the 
differential effects of a treatment on the experimental versus the control group. It requires 
measuring the dependent variable for both groups before and after the treatment. To create the 
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treatment group, we first computed the drop in housing prices in each MSA between 2007, when 
the prices were at the peak before Crisis, and 2011, when the prices were at the lowest. 
Depending on the percentage drop in prices by 2011 from 2007, the MSAs were divided into two 
halves. A dummy ‘Hit by Crisis’ was created with value 1 for MSAs that experienced higher 
than median drop in housing prices. Subsequently, we created the time-dummy for the Crisis and 
recession years. As evident from Figure 1, the housing prices registered first decline in our 
annual data in 2008 and didn’t start recovering across MSAs till 2013. Hence, in our dataset, 
Crisis & recession spanned from 2008 to 2012; following our lag structure, the time-dummy is 1 
(t=1) for years 2010-2014 (equation 1). Results of the analysis are presented in Table 5. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 In line with our argument, MSAs that were severely affected by the crisis (hit = 1) 
exhibited a higher incidence of exploration during the Crisis & recession period (t = 1). Model 4 
shows a declining trend in regional exploration over time; the years 2010-14 predicted a decline 
in exploration with a coefficient-size of 0.8238 (p: 0.000). It is because of the way distant search 
in the regions is operationalized. We identified, rather conservatively, only the first patent in a 
technology main class from the region as exploration, all the subsequent patenting in that class is 
identified as exploitation. In Model 5, we introduced the interaction between crisis years and the 
MSAs which were hit severely by the crisis. The period 2010-14 has a negative effect on the 
incidence of distant search in regions (coefficient: -0.8871; p= 0.000). However, MSAs that 
experienced above-median shock (Hit = 1) engaged significantly more in distant search 
(coefficient: 0.1282; p= 0.000). These results strengthen the argument of causality between 
economic crisis and regional exploration. 
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5. Exploring potential mechanisms 
Having established a robust positive effect of Financial Crisis (and recession) on regional 
exploration, we examined three theoretically informed potential mechanisms which can explain 
the relationship.  
5.1 R&D strategy of resourceful innovators 
Economic crises and recessions may induce a strategic shift in resourceful innovator firms from 
exploitation to exploration. Downturns adversely affect demand conditions and firms’ 
performance. When its performance declines below aspiration levels, a firm undertakes 
problemistic search, and accentuates exploration, especially when increased exploitation doesn’t 
restore its performance (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003). As exploitation doesn’t pay off 
under weak demand, the opportunity cost of undertaking exploration is also lower (Aghion & 
Saint-Paul 1998; Aghion et al, 2012). Additionally, economic crises and recessions increase 
macroeconomic and microeconomic uncertainty, which incentivizes firms to create “growth 
options” in emerging and futuristic technologies (Bloom, 2014; Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, 
Saporta-Eksten & Terry, 2018). Exploratory tendencies are pronounced in R&D-intensive firms 
as growth options increase their valuation (Kraft, Schwartz & Weiss, 2017). In a qualitative 
study, Laperche, Lefebvre & Langlet (2011) reported that during Financial Crisis, French 
incumbents aggressively pursued green technologies which could help them develop and 
dominate new niches. Thales focused on lowering CO2 emission from aircrafts; ArcelorMittal 
and Saint-Gobain shifted their R&D towards developing environmentally sustainable products 
and processes. Similarly, automobile firms entered the segments of electric (Renault) and hybrid 
(PSA) cars. 
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 Thus, while high concentration of resourceful firms would normally negatively affect 
regional exploration (Denrell & March, 2001; Henkel et al., 2015; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), 
it should positively predict it during Crisis and recession (Greve, 2003; Aghion et al, 2012; 
Bloom, 2014). We computed concentration of resourceful innovators by Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) in patenting by assignees in the region. As we argue that such firms change their 
R&D strategy during Crisis, we created dummies for the Crisis and recession years (t-1 = 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2007-2012) 6. We test the effects of interaction term of HHI-assignees and crisis 
year dummies on regional exploration. 
Explorationit+1 = β0+ β1.Crisis yeart-1 + β2.HHI-assigneesit + β3(Crisis yeart*HHI-assigneesit) + 
αZ+ εit  … (2) 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 We find that while concentration of patenting by assignee firms, i.e., presence of 
resourceful innovator firms, normally had a negative effect on regional exploration, their 
concentration during the Crisis years had a positive effect. Effects of the interaction term are 
strongest at the onset of Crisis (Models 6 and 7), i.e., 2007 (coefficient: 0.1831; p: 0.000) and 
2008 (coefficient: 0.1858; p: 0.000). The effect size becomes smaller for 2009 (Model 8) 
(coefficient: 0.1038; p: 0.014). If we take the whole period of 2007-12 as Crisis & recession 
period, the effect-size is even smaller (Model 9) (coefficient: 0.0413; p: 0.058). It is because 
                                                          
6 R&D-intensive resourceful firms have necessary systems, processes and capabilities to innovate and file patents 
speedily (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1996). They also have strategic reasons to speed up innovation 
and patenting. Value of an option is inversely proportional to the time elapsed between initial investment and the 
start of positive cash flow; hence, delay would decrease the value of firms’ growth options (McGrath, 1997). 
Payoffs of speeding up innovation and patenting are higher in emerging technologies (Munari & Toschi, 2014; 
Toivanen & Novotny, 2017). Hence, we modified the lag between Crisis and regional exploration from 3 to 2 years. 
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firms adapt their aspiration levels over time, wearing down the intensity of problemistic search 
(Cyert & March, 1963). Further, the process of variation (exploration) is followed by selection 
and retention (exploitation). If a firm has created some growth options, it tends follow them with 
further innovation and patenting in those technologies. While firm’s first patent in a growth 
option technology (USPC main class) is counted as exploration (if no previous inventor from the 
region filed patent in that technology), the subsequent patenting in that technology is not counted 
as exploration in our dataset. Overall, the results suggest that resourceful innovators emphasize 
exploration during Crisis, and higher their concentration in regional innovation in these times, 
higher is the incidence of exploration. 
 We further tested whether concentration of resourceful innovators in region’s patenting 
during Crisis mediates the latter’s effect on regional exploration. The mediating variable is 
operationalized as interaction between HHI of patenting by assignees and the crisis year. For this 
analysis, we focus only on the onset of Crisis (t-2 = 2007).  
Explorationi t+1 = β0+ β1Shocki t-2+ β2 (Crisis yeart*HHI-assigneeit) + αZ+ εit  … (3) 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 Table 7 presents the analyses. HPI (opposite of Crisis and recession) has a negative 
significant effect (coefficient: -0.1269; p= 0.000) on the concentration (HHI) of assignees in 
regional innovation in the Crisis year (Model 10). It is consistent with the literature as 
resourceful firms tend to increase their R&D investments during such periods (Aghion & Saint-
Paul, 1998; Aghion et al, 2012; Archibugi et al, 2013; Flammer & Iaonnou, 2020) whereas firms 
dependent on external funding indeed reduce innovation (Lee et al, 2015; Brautzsch et al, 2015; 
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Paunov, 2012). Model 11 tests whether including the mediating variable (HHI assignees during 
Crisis year) as a factor in the equation reduces the effect-size of Crisis and recession on regional 
exploration. Our mediating variable has a significant positive effect (coefficient: 0.0506; p= 
0.000) on regional exploration. Effect-size of HPI on regional exploration was increased from -
0.0703 (p: 0.000) (Model 2) to -0.0636 (p= 0.000). We conducted Sobel-Goodman mediation 
analysis (Table 8) and observed that the 9.167% of the total effect of Crisis on regional 
exploration was mediated through increased HHI of assignees (year 2007). The coefficients of 
direct and mediated effects are -0.0636 (p: 0.000) and -0.0064 (p: 0.000) respectively.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 Economic crises and recessions may lead to firm-failures, termination of several 
exploitation-related projects, new venturing, especially necessity-driven entrepreneurship, and 
starting of new exploratory projects. These developments influence both the demography of 
regional actors, and the patterns of collaborations. Hence, we tested two potential mechanisms – 
entry of new regional actors (organizations and inventors), and change in the hierarchy of 
regional innovation (coinventors) network. 
5.2 Entry of new inventors and ventures in the region 
Distant search in a region can be brought by the inventors coming from outside the MSAs. 
Knowledge is predominantly tacit in the early stages of technology life-cycle and hence 
embedded in the inventors. Their mobility is an important conduit of knowledge-flow into the 
region (Breschi & Lissoni, 2009; Song, Almeida, & Wu, 2003; Singh & Agrawal, 2011). Entry 
of new-generation inventors specializing in emerging technologies may also influence regional 
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exploration. Accordingly, we created a variable – “newness of the inventors in the region” to 
capture patenting experience of the most junior co-inventor from the region. For instance, if a 
patent is filed by a single inventor, who is highly experienced – the patent is his 120th innovation, 
but he has newly relocated to the MSA, from where it is only his 2nd filed patent, the variable 
“newness of inventors in the region” will compute the experience 2 and not 120. Similarly, 
suppose two more inventors – one from the region (8th patent from the region) and the other from 
outside the region (22nd patent) – have patented the innovation mentioned above. The newness 
variable still reads 2. Thus, the variable captures how from much new insight, from region’s 
perspectives, was infused for the innovation.  
 Similarly, a change in organizational population can affect regional exploration. New 
ventures have higher incentives and abilities to undertake exploration (Henkel, Ronde & 
Wagner, 2015; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Even when an inventor leaves a firm and starts a 
new venture (new assignee) or applies for patent-rights as individual assignees (potentially pre-
incubation stage), he is more likely to engage in distant searches because of de-socialization and 
cognitive unbounding (Cirillo, Brusoni, & Valentini, 2014; March, 1991). On the other hand, 
large incumbents tend to favor exploitation (Denrell & March, 2001; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986). We capture entries through the share of patenting by the first-time assignees. It proxies 
three conditions: (1) de alio entries into the region, (2) de novo ventures in the region, and (c) 
first-time individual assignees (potentially pre-incubation stage ventures). All these can favor 
distant search from the regional perspective.  
 We first tested whether Financial Crisis and recession had positive effects on the two 
variables, viz., newness of inventors and entrepreneurial entries. 
Newness of inventorsit = β0+ β1.Shockit-2+ αZ+ εit  … (4) 
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Entrepreneurial entriesit = β0+ β1.Shockit-2+ αZ+ εit  … (5) 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 In Table 9, Models 12 and 13 respectively present the effects of Financial Crisis and 
recession on the entry of inventors and organizations in regions. Model 12 shows that HPI had a 
non-significant effect (coefficient: 0.0067; p= 0.698) on inventors’ mean newness. It seems that 
Crisis and recession didn’t affect the inward mobility of inventors into the region or the 
induction of new-generation inventors. Indeed, sign of the coefficient suggests that inwards 
mobility and induction of new generation inventors take place when the economic situation are 
favorable. Similarly, Model 13 shows that HPI had a positive but non-significant effect on the 
entry of technology ventures (coefficient: 0.0152; p= 0.386). Crisis might lead to necessity-
venturing by displaced inventors in the region (Dahl & Sorenson, 2010), but it seems largely 
inconsequential for regional innovation, at least in terms of patenting. Entries and innovation by 
new ventures may also be fewer because of their dependence up external funding and higher 
costs of capital during crises and recessions. Thus, we can argue that regional exploration during 
crises and recessions is not spearheaded by the entry of new inventors or ventures. 
5.3 Structural change in region’s innovation network 
Search processes are facilitated and constrained by network-structure (Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne 
& Kraimer, 2001). Network studies provide ample evidence that exploration and distant search 
are favored by flatter structures. They support diverse worldviews and parallel search processes, 
leading to greater exploration (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; Lazer & Friedman, 2007). Studies 
indicate that hierarchy or centralization negatively impact improvisation, idea-generation and 
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performance in highly exploratory contexts (Keum & See 2016; Sparrowe et al, 2001). Based on 
these works, we examined whether crisis-induced structural changes in the regional innovation 
networks is a mediating mechanism.  
 We operationalize our mediating variable – hierarchy of the regional innovation network 
– in terms of degree centralization of region’s innovation network (Chang & Shih, 2005). 
Centralization is a whole-network property, which denotes the extent to which the network is 
organized around its most central node (Freeman, 1979). It is measured by calculating the sum of 
the difference in the centrality of its most central node and all other nodes in the network, and 
then dividing it by the theoretically largest sum of the differences (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 
2018). Thus, network-centralization 𝐶𝑥 is measured as follows, when 𝑝𝑚is the node with highest 
centrality.7 
𝐶𝑥 = 
∑ 𝐶𝑥(𝑝𝑚)
𝑁
𝑖=1 −𝐶𝑥(𝑝𝑖)
𝑚𝑎𝑥∑ 𝐶𝑥(𝑝𝑚)
𝑁
𝑖=1 −𝐶𝑥(𝑝𝑖)
  … (6) 
 We first tested whether Crisis and recession decreased centralization in the regional 
innovation network, and subsequently, whether including centralization in equation 1 reduced 
the effect size of Crisis and recession on regional exploration. 
Centralizationi t = β0+ β1Shocki t-2+ αZ+ εit  … (7)  
Explorationi t+1 = β0+ β1Shocki t-2+ β5Centralizationi t+ αZ+ εit  … (8) 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 10 about here 
------------------------------------ 
                                                          
7 The notion of centralization relates, but is different from, the construct of core periphery. A highly centralized 
network has a core-periphery structure. 
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 Table 10 presents the analyses. Model 14 shows a positive and significant effect of the 
HPI (coefficient: 0.0375; p= 0.002) on degree centralization in the regional innovation network. 
Thus, Crisis and recession decreased hierarchy in the regional network. In Model 15, we 
included centralization in the equation, which has a significant negative effect (coefficient: -
0.0744; p= 0.000) on regional exploration. Further, the effect-size of HPI on regional exploration 
was increased to -0.0675 (p= 0.000) from -0.0703 (p=0.000) in Model 2. Table 11 presents the 
results of Sobel-Goodman mediation analysis. We observe that Crisis and recession had a 
relatively small mediated effect (4.06% of total effect) on exploration by affecting the structural 
characteristics of regional knowledge-network. Coefficients of the direct and the indirect effects 
are respectively -0.0675 (p: 0.000) and -.0028 (p= 0.014).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 11 about here 
------------------------------------ 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
This study reveals at least one potential upside of economic crises! It takes an empirical 
approach to understand how economic crises and recessions trigger distant search processes and 
exploratory learning in regions. Exploration is efficient in long run (March, 1991) – this is how a 
region creates technological diversity and specialization in emerging technologies. Contributing 
to region’s dynamic adaptability, exploration makes regions resilient to future shocks. In this 
sense, our work resonates with the scholars who conceptualize resilience in terms of “bouncing 
forward” and creation of new efficient specialization lock-ins along adapted trajectories rather 
than “bouncing back” to the old ones (Boschma, 2015; Martin & Sunley, 2015).  
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 Evidence related to mediating mechanisms extends our knowledge about crises and 
recessions. Previous research suggests that the resourceful innovator firms tend to “invest their 
way out of crisis”. They indeed increase their R&D expenditure during downturns, which 
normally improves their performance (Archibugi, Filippetti, & Frenz, 2013; Aghion, Berman, 
Eymard, Askenazy, & Cette, 2012; Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1998; Amore, 2015; Flammer & 
Ioannou, 2018). However, positive effect of the concentration of resourceful firms in regional 
innovation during crises and recessions on regional exploration suggest that indeed these firms 
actively engage in distant search processes. Thus, crises press firms to commit to and produce 
new technologies – and as Bloom (2014) argues, create growth options and place bets on the 
technologies of future. In this sense, our paper also contributes to the literature on strategy.  
 Another mechanism which found empirical support, albeit with low effect size, was the 
decrease in hierarchy in regional innovation network. One possible reason can be termination of 
existing exploitation related projects in core technology areas, to which inventors of high 
centrality would normally belong. Secondly, firms’ strategic emphasis on growth options and 
support to bottom-up projects may lead to creation of new ties between the non-central inventors. 
Most importantly, our study empirically establishes a relationship between hierarchy, which is a 
structural factor, and regional exploration, which is an innovation outcome (Carnabuci & Operti, 
2013; Fang, Lee, & Schilling, 2010; Fleming et al, 2007; Keum & See 2016; Lazer & Friedman, 
2007), when the hierarchy itself is changing temporally due to an exogenous factor. Thus, we 
respond to scholars calling for research on network dynamics (Ahuja, Soda & Zaheer, 2012; 
Brenner, Cantner, & Graf, 2013). 
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FIGURES AND TABLES  
Table 1. List of Variables, their Operationalization and Data-sources 
Constructs Operationalization Data-sources 
Unit of analysis 
Region Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), in the 
USA 
NLSY Geocode 
Codebook 
supplement (9) 
Dependent variable 
Regional exploration A patented invention denotes a case of 
exploration if it is assigned a main-class, in 
which no other patent from the MSA was 
assigned in the last ten years. 
USPTO (US Patent 
Classification data) 
Independent variable 
Economic crisis & 
recession (main 
equation) 
Changes in housing price index in MSA. HPI 
(non-seasonally adjusted; average of all 
quarters). Lower the index, higher the intensity 
of crisis & recession. 
Federal Housing 
Finance Agency 
Economic crisis & 
recession (for 
robustness analysis) 
Per capita GDP (chained 2009 US Dollars) in 
the MSA. Lower the GDP, higher the intensity 
of crisis & recession. 
US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(regional data) 
Control variables 
Region’s intellectual 
resourcefulness 
Natural log of the size (number of 
nodes/inventors) of MSA’s co-patenting 
network 
USPTO: Patent-
inventor-location 
Connectedness of 
inventors in region 
Percentage of nodes (inventors) forming 
largest connected component in MSA’s co-
patenting network  
USPTO: Patent-
inventor-location 
Density of inventors’ 
collaboration in region 
Average degree of each node (inventor) in 
MSA’s co-patenting network  
USPTO: Patent-
inventor-location 
Outward orientation of 
regional inventors 
Ratio of total number of external collaboration 
ties over total number of internal ties, formed 
by inventors in MSA 
USPTO: Patent-
inventor-location 
Technological 
concentration in 
patenting 
Herfindahl index (HHI) of patenting in the 
MSA by USPC technology main classes 
USPTO: Patent-
inventor-location-
classification 
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Relative size of high-
technology sector 
Natural log of the number of employees in 
high-tech industries out of the total number of 
employees in the MSA 
US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(regional data) 
Quality of human 
capital in high-tech 
Per capita annual payment in the high-tech 
sectors in the MSA 
US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(regional data) 
Policy support to 
higher education  
Per capita expenditure on higher education at 
the state level 
US Census Bureau: 
State and Local 
Government 
Finance (state data) 
Technology main-
class assignment FE 
Number of patents filed by inventors from the 
MSA in each USPC main-class (up to 2 digits) 
in the given application year 
USPTO: US Patent 
classification at time 
of issue; inventor-
region 
Year FE Application year of patent-filing USPTO: US Patent 
application date 
For test of mechanisms 
Newness of inventors 
in the region 
Mean experience of the junior-most co-
inventors of all patents filed from the MSA. 
USPTO: Patent-
inventor-location  
Entrant assignees in 
the region 
Share of patenting done by the first-time 
assignees in the MSA.  
USPTO: Patent-
assignee-location  
Hierarchy in region’s 
innovation network 
Degree-centralization of MSA’s co-patenting 
network of inventors 
USPTO: Patent-
inventor-location 
Dominance of 
resourceful innovators  
Herfindahl index (HHI) of patenting in the 
MSA by assignee organizations. 
USPTO: Patent-
assignee-location  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Analysis (Variables and their distribution) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Share of exploration 7,426 0.141 0.184 0 1 
Housing Price Index 7,023 169.087 36.492 86.714 364.25 
Per capita GDP (MSA) 6,576 4.165 1.223 1.586 17.831 
Network size (log) 6,146 5.264 1.798 0 10.356 
Share - largest component 6,146 0.118 0.103 0.008 1 
Average degree 6,146 1.363 1.010 0 5.844 
Outward orientation 6,802 6.031 10.600 0 229 
HHI – USPC main class 7,418 0.198 0.238 0.026 1 
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Employment in high-tech (log) 6,355 9.219 1.571 3.689 13.949 
PC salaries in high-tech 6,355 49.732 15.091 13.975 165.953 
PC state-funding to higher ed. 5,707 0.680 0.375 0 8.119 
Newness of inventors* 7,426 6.217 8.307 1 270.333 
Entrant assignees* 5,443 0.294 0.208 0.011 1 
Network hierarchy* 6,144 0.042 3252.331 1 31432 
HHI – assignees* 7,378 0.165 0.180 0.004 1 
*In the test of mechanism 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix of independent and control variable [after Panel Regression (Fixed Effects) Model] 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Housing Price Index 1             
2 Network size (log) -.075 1            
3 Share - largest component .043 .019 1           
4 Average degree .024 -.447 -.401 1          
5 Outward orientation -.021 .026 -.001 .074 1         
6 HHI – USPC main class -.067 .106 -.005 -.038 -.043 1        
7 Employment in high-tech (log) .010 -.014 -.009 .010 .010 -.004 1       
8 PC salaries in high-tech -.078 -.013 .039 -.012 .014 .026 -.107 1      
9 PC state-funding to higher ed. .005 -.026 -.001 .024 -.000 -.000 -.004 -.023 1     
10 Newness of inventors* .007 -.013 -.021 -.014 -.044 -.023 .006 .018 -.016 1    
11 Entrant assignees* -.015 .088 .024 -.011 .030 -.029 -.013 .020 .000 .059 1   
12 Network hierarchy* -.047 .234 -.330 -.300 .029 .024 .013 -.004 -.009 .001 .064 1  
13 HHI – assignees* .011 .057 -.165 -.024 -.018 -.123 -.047 .008 -.021 -.127 .152 .058 1 
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Table 4. Effects of Economic Crisis on Regional Exploration 
 
 
Table 5. Difference-in-difference: Effect of Economic Crisis on Regional Exploration 
  Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES FE Panel regression FE Panel regression 
 Regional exploration Regional exploration  
1.Crisis (2011-14) -0.8238*** -0.8871*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0649) 
1.Hit   (Omitted) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES FE Panel regression FE Panel regression FE Panel regression 
 Regional exploration Regional exploration  Regional exploration  
    
Housing Price Index  -0.0703***  
  (0.0146)  
Per capita GDP (MSA)   -0.0698* 
   (0.0333) 
Network size (log) -0.5228*** -0.4841*** -0.5184*** 
 (0.1084) (0.1084) (0.1084) 
Share - largest component 0.0072 -0.0111 -0.0075 
 (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0223) 
Average degree -0.0020 -0.0048 -0.0024 
 (0.0365) (0.0364) (0.0365) 
Outward orientation 0.0081 0.0092 0.0081 
 (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
HHI – USPC main class -0.0164 -0.0094 -0.0157 
 (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0235) 
Employment in high-tech (log) 0.0442 0.0420 0.0465 
 (0.0327) (0.0326) (0.0327) 
PC salaries in high-tech 0.0870*** 0.0952*** 0.0901*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
PC state-funding to higher ed. 0.0113 0.0109 0.0120 
 (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0100) 
USPC Main class FE YES YES YES 
Application year FE YES YES YES 
Constant 0.2284** 0.1526*** 0.2236*** 
 (0.0427) (0.0454) (0.0427) 
    
Observations 4,487 4,487 4,487 
R-squared 0.2542 0.2586 0.2550 
Number of MSAstate 435 435 435 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1  
41 
 
1.Crisis (2011-14) # 1.Hit  0.1282*** 
  (0.0317) 
Network size (log) -0.5228*** -0.5219*** 
 (0.1084) (0.1082) 
Share - largest component -0.0072 -0.0087 
 (0.0224) (0.0223) 
Average degree -0.0020 -0.0011 
 (0.0365) (0.0364) 
Outward orientation 0.0081 0.0088 
 (0.0094) (0.0094) 
HHI – USPC main class -0.0164 -0.0156 
 (0.0235) (0.0234) 
Employment in high-tech (log) 0.0442 0.0514 
 (0.0327) (0.0326) 
PC salaries in high-tech 0.0870*** 0.0897*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0231) 
PC state-funding to higher ed. 0.0113 0.0116 
 (0.0100) (0.0100) 
USPC Main class FE YES YES 
Application year FE YES YES 
Constant 0.2284*** 0.2253*** 
 (0.0427) (0.0426) 
   
Observations 4,487 4,487 
R-squared 0.2542 0.2573 
Number of MSAstate 435 435 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
 
Table 6. Effects of concentration of patenting by assignee firms during Crisis on regional 
exploration 
  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
VARIABLES FE panel regression 
 Regional exploration 
Crisis years 2007 2008  2009  2007-2012  
     
HHI assignees -0.0971*** -0.0860*** -0.0855*** -0.0932*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0207) 
1.crisis -0.0784^ -0.1407** -0.2671*** -0.7851*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0431) (0.0443) (0.0477) 
1.crisis # c.HHI assignee 0.1831*** 0.1858*** 0.1038* 0.0413^ 
 (0.0351) (0.0418) (0.0422) (0.0218) 
Network size -0.5427*** -0.5289*** -0.5381*** -0.5274*** 
42 
 
 (0.1074) (0.1075) (0.1077) (0.1080) 
Share - largest component 0.0035 0.0015 0.0043 0.0049 
 (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0226) 
Average degree  -0.0000 0.0006 0.0013 -0.0011 
 (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0362) 
Outward orientation 0.0080 0.0078 0.0085 0.0079 
 (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
HHI – USPC main class 0.0117 0.0086 0.0104 0.0072 
 (0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
Employment in high-tech (log) 0.0521 0.0516 0.0515 0.0524 
 (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0325) 
PC salaries in high-tech 0.0862*** 0.0837*** 0.0874*** 0.0865*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0230) 
PC state-funding to higher ed. 0.0122 0.0121 0.0118 0.0123 
 (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) 
USPC Main class FE YES 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 
Application year FE YES (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Constant 0.2269*** 0.2265*** 0.2269*** 0.2227*** 
 (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0425) (0.0426) 
     
Observations 4,483 4,483 4,483 4,483 
R-squared 0.2641 0.2627 0.2602 0.2597 
Number of MSAstate 435 435 435 435 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
 
 
Table 7. Effects of Economic Crisis on HHI of assignees and regional exploration 
 Model 10 Model 11 
VARIABLES FE Panel regression FE Panel regression 
 
HHI assignees*Crisis 
year (2007) Regional exploration 
   
Housing Price Index -0.1269*** -0.0636*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0145) 
HHI assignees*Crisis year (2007)  0.0506*** 
  (0.0105) 
HHI assignees 0.2658*** -0.0958*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0200) 
Network size (log) 0.0851 -0.5076*** 
 (0.1628) (0.1074) 
43 
 
 
 
TABLE 8: Sobel-Goodman Mediation Analysis – HHI assignees in regional innovation 
during Crisis 
 Coefficient Std. Error Z P<|Z| 
Sobel -.0064164 .00173455 -3.699 .0002163 
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -.0064164 .00174977 -3.667 .00024542 
Goodman-2 -.0064164 .00171919 -3.732q .0001898 
     
a coefficient -.126881 .021866 -5.80267     6.5e-09 
b coefficient .05057 .010533 4.80129 1.6e-06 
Indirect effect -.006416 .001735 -3.69917 .000216 
Direct effect -.063577 .014492 -4.38696 .000011 
Total effect -.069993 .014471 -4.83681 1.3e-06 
     
Proportion of the total effect that is mediated:  .09167175 
Ratio of indirect to direct effect: .10092359 
Ratio of total to direct effect: 1.1009236 
  
Share - largest component 0.0117*** -0.0001 
 (0.0341) (0.0225) 
Average degree -0.0105*** -0.0025 
 (0.0546) (0.0360) 
Outward orientation 0.0062 0.0090 
 (0.0141) (0.0093) 
HHI – USPC main class -0.0277 0.0176 
 (0.0358) (0.0236) 
Employment in high-tech (log) -0.0265 0.0500 
 (0.0489) (0.0323) 
PC salaries in high-tech -0.0298 0.0938*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0229) 
PC state-funding to higher ed. 0.0028 0.0118 
 (0.0149) (0.0098) 
USPC Main class FE YES YES 
Application year FE YES YES 
Constant 1.3698 0.2142 
 (0.9633) (0.6298) 
   
Observations 4,483 4,483 
R-squared 0.5677 0.6881 
Number of MSAstate 435 435 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
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Table 9. Effects of Economic Crisis on entry of inventors and ventures 
 
 
Table 10. Effects of Economic Crisis on network hierarchy and regional exploration 
 Model 12 Model 13 
VARIABLES FE Panel regression FE Panel regression 
 Newness of inventors Entrepreneurial entry 
   
Housing Price Index 0.0067 0.0152 
 (0.0173) (0.0175) 
Network size (log) 0.0831 -0.5372*** 
 (0.1287) (0.1341) 
Share - largest component 0.0706** -0.1265*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0277) 
Average degree 0.0353 -0.0316 
 (0.0433) (0.0446) 
Outward orientation 0.0312** -0.0229* 
 (0.0112) (0.0108) 
HHI – USPC main class 0.0464^ 0.0149 
 (0.0277) (0.0280) 
Employment in high-tech (log) 0.0040 0.0153 
 (0.0388) (0.0389) 
PC salaries in high-tech -0.0317 -0.0323 
 (0.0276) (0.0277) 
PC state-funding to higher ed. 0.0138 -0.0037 
 (0.0118) (0.0114) 
USPC Main class FE YES YES 
Application year FE YES YES 
Constant -0.1188* 0.2390*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0481) 
   
Observations 4,498 4,113 
R-squared 0.0761 0.0859 
Number of MSAstate 435 434 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
 Model 14 Model 15 
VARIABLES FE Panel regression FE Panel regression 
 Degree centralization Regional exploration 
   
Housing Price Index 0.0375** -0.0675*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0146) 
Degree centralization  -0.0744*** 
  (0.0191) 
Network size (log) -1.2784*** -0.5800*** 
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TABLE 11: Sobel-Goodman Mediation Analysis – Degree-centralization (Hierarchy) in 
Regional Innovation Network 
 Coefficient Std. Error Z P<|Z| 
Sobel -.00285789 .00116378 -2.413 .01583169 
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -.00285789 .00118666 -2.365 .01801967 
Goodman-2 -.00285789 .00114044 -2.463 .01376566 
     
a coefficient .038426 .012148 3.16313 .001561 
b coefficient -.074374 .01909 -3.89605 .000098 
Indirect effect -.002858 .001164 -2.45569 .014061 
Direct effect -.067471 .014558 -4.63458 3.6e-06 
Total effect -.070329 .014566 -4.82834 1.4e-06 
     
Proportion of the total effect that is mediated:  .04063601 
Ratio of indirect to direct effect: .04235724 
Ratio of total to direct effect: 1.0423572 
       
 (0.0901) (0.1109) 
Share - largest component 0.4163*** 0.0198 
 (0.0186) (0.0236) 
Average degree 0.5847*** 0.0388 
 (0.0303) (0.0380) 
Outward orientation -0.0151^ 0.0080 
 (0.0078) (0.0094) 
HHI – USPC main class -0.0541** -0.0135 
 (0.0194) (0.0234) 
Employment in high-tech (log) -0.0320 0.0397 
 (0.0272) (0.0325) 
PC salaries in high-tech -0.0016 0.0951*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0231) 
PC state-funding to higher ed. 0.0029 0.0111 
 (0.0083) (0.0099) 
USPC Main class FE YES YES 
Application year FE YES YES 
Constant 0.1111** 0.1611 *** 
 (0.0377) (0.0454) 
   
Observations 4,498 4,487 
R-squared 0.3573 0.2614 
Number of MSAstate 435 435 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
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Figure 1. Movement of Housing Price Index (mean across MSAs) and US GDP 
 
 
Source: FRED Economic Data – US GDP. Available on https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP  
 
